



IN CHINA’S VIEW OF NEW U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, CONTINUITY OUTWEIGHS CHANGE

John S. Van Oudenaren, BluePath Labs

PRC state media and think tank interpretations of the Trump administration’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) underscore that the PRC generally views the strategy as a roadmap to reduce the costs of “hegemony” and thereby make America’s role as a leading world power more sustainable. Consequently, PRC observers tend to view any changes in the NSS’s approach to China as strategic adjustments by the U.S., rather than fundamental alterations to American foreign policy. In Beijing’s eyes, all indicators point to the endurance of a U.S.-China strategic rivalry centered on Taiwan, trade, and technology.

Parsing Government, Media, and Think Tank Perspectives

Chinese government, media, and expert responses to the new NSS are generally consistent, although each plays a different role. The government response focuses on asserting China’s core interests and Beijing’s desires for U.S.-China relations, while media responses outline the acceptable boundaries of analysis. Within these parameters, experts assess shifts in U.S. strategy as laid out in the NSS and consider the opportunities and risks they may present for China.

The PRC’s official response to the second Trump administration’s NSS, released in late November 2025, was relatively circumscribed. Beijing pushed back on the U.S.’s restatement of its longstanding commitment to opposing unilateral changes to the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, while also calling for sustaining U.S.-China economic linkages based on “mutual benefit” and “win-win cooperation.”¹ This relatively muted official response likely reflects recent PRC efforts to stabilize relations with the U.S., including paring back tariffs and export controls on key technologies. Those efforts culminated in the October 30, 2025 Busan Summit between President Trump and General Secretary Xi that resulted in reductions in U.S. tariffs and PRC rare earth export bans, a truce that Beijing saw as contributing to stabilizing the broader relationship.² At the

China Institute of International Studies' year-end symposium on international relations, for instance, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that "in the past year, China-U.S. relations, despite shocks and ups and downs, realized overall and dynamic stability," serving the "shared interests of the people in both countries" as well as the international community.³

State media and experts at think tanks offer broader perspectives that shed light on how PRC foreign policy circles are parsing the NSS. These accounts see the NSS as a major U.S. foreign policy shift, noting its pivot to the Western Hemisphere as the U.S.'s primary strategic focus, coupled with the insistence that allies and partners assume greater responsibilities for regional security. However, they also largely interpret the NSS as the U.S. continuing to identify China as its primary strategic threat, albeit in a more selective manner. In doing so, PRC analyses of the NSS generally argue that the U.S. refocusing on core economic, technological, and strategic interests, including prioritizing its near abroad in Latin America, reflects American efforts to achieve a more sustainable and cost-effective "hegemony."⁴ For example, an editorial on the website of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) stated that the new strategy does not entail America "laying down the butcher's knife and instantly becoming a Buddha," but rather shows that the U.S. is marshaling its resources to more efficiently pursue its most "urgent needs."⁵

Chinese media and foreign policy analysts broadly characterized the January 3, 2026, U.S. raid in Venezuela that resulted in the capture of Nicolas Maduro as evidence of the application of the NSS in practice. Such analyses generally assessed the operation as clear evidence of the U.S. abandoning a façade of liberal internationalism in favor of exercising overt hegemony in its near abroad, characterized by the extensive application of military force to advance its own interests.⁶ Beijing's criticism of U.S. foreign policy as hegemonic is not new, however. During the Biden administration, the PRC Foreign Ministry released a white paper titled "U.S. Hegemony and Its Perils," accusing Washington of long employing a "hegemonic playbook" that exploits democracy and human rights as pretexts for foreign intervention.⁷

Official Responses

Official Chinese responses to the NSS focused narrowly on criticizing U.S. Taiwan policy as stated in the NSS, wherein the U.S. opposes any attempts to unilaterally alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait as an infringement of "the most central of China's core interests."⁸ At the same time, official spokespeople expressed hope for increased bilateral cooperation, better management of differences, and the overall improvement of U.S.-China relations. On December 8, 2025, PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiankun stressed that "China has always maintained that cooperation between China and the U.S. benefits both sides, while confrontation harms both sides."⁹ Guo reiterated the PRC's longstanding official line that Taiwan is solely an internal issue for the PRC and the "first inviolable red line in U.S.-China relations."¹⁰

At a December 10 press conference, PRC State Council Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua also emphasized the official line that Taiwan is a purely internal affair for the Chinese people to manage.¹¹ Chen warned U.S. policymakers to “handle the Taiwan issue with utmost caution” and to “stop condoning” or “sending wrong signals to ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.”¹²

At the Ministry of National Defense’s regular press conference on December 15, 2025, Senior Colonel Jiang Bin addressed the NSS’s opposition to “unilateral changes” to the status quo in the Taiwan Straits.¹³ Jiang responded by stressing the official line that “to ‘use Taiwan to contain China’ is futile.” He urged the U.S. to “earnestly abide by the one-China principle and the three U.S.-China joint communiqués, stop sending wrong signals to the “Taiwan independence” separatist forces, and stop escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.”¹⁴

State Media Responses

State media articles, particularly editorial pieces, provide a broader PRC perspective on the NSS, generally framing it as seeking to transition U.S. foreign policy away from its post-Cold War pursuit of global primacy to a leaner, more efficient, and more sustainable version of American hegemony. For example, on December 16, the website of the CCP’s theoretical journal, *Qiushi*, published an article titled “Continuity and Change in the New U.S. National Security Strategy” under the pen name Zhong Yan, which is used to connote authoritative interpretations of key issues. It contended that the NSS represents a necessary strategic adjustment by the U.S. to recent shifts in the balance of power that have been to China’s favor.¹⁵ The article argues that the narrowing of U.S. foreign policy ambitions to “core national interests” may “appear to be a pragmatic shift, but it actually reflects the deep anxiety of the U.S. ruling class regarding its relative decline in power and escalating domestic contradictions.”¹⁶ As regards U.S. policy towards China, Zhong Yan perceives an important shift “from comprehensive to focused competition in specific areas and from value-driven to interest-oriented approaches.”¹⁷ Consequently, the article contends that the U.S.’s focus has altered from seeing the PRC as posing a comprehensive security and ideological threat to viewing China as a structural rival in a competition that is predominantly economic, industrial, and technological in nature. According to *Qiushi*, this stems from the report’s unprecedented acknowledgement that the U.S. and China are “nearly evenly matched.” This is taken as Washington’s strategic recognition of China’s burgeoning “comprehensive national power,” a key benchmark for the Chinese Communist Party to gauge progress towards its central objectives, such as realizing national rejuvenation.¹⁸

On December 11, *China Military Online*, the PLA’s news site, published a commentary titled “The New U.S. National Security Strategy: A Guide to Hegemonic Cost Reduction and Efficiency.”¹⁹ The article states that the NSS “explicitly” acknowledges “that the U.S. will no longer pursue global hegemony but will instead shift its focus back to its own ‘backyard’—Latin America.” It argues that “the U.S. has not abandoned its hegemonic nature but is instead seeking

to concentrate its power in key regions.” Moreover, the *China Military Online* piece contends that the NSS’s requirement that Indo-Pacific allies increase their defense spending and permit greater U.S. military basing access compels Japan, Australia, and South Korea to bear the risks of conflict. Consequently, it contends this “burden-sharing’ is merely a way to shift the costs of confrontation onto allies, while the U.S. reaps the benefits.”²⁰

A Xinhua analysis piece credits the new NSS with adopting a more “pragmatic” approach to international security, including refocusing on the Western Hemisphere.²¹ However, the piece contends that Washington is invoking the Monroe Doctrine to justify its regional “interference” and sustain America's hegemonic position. It claims that because “the cost for the U.S. to maintain its global hegemony is constantly rising, the Trump administration's ‘reasoning’ is based on a hegemonic pragmatism” that seeks to reduce the costs while optimizing efficiency.²²

Another Xinhua article compared the new NSS with the last two U.S. national security strategies issued during the Biden and first Trump administrations.²³ The piece notes that the new NSS is strikingly different in tone and worldview from its predecessors but nevertheless contains core continuities. It observes that all three strategies share the main theme of “maintaining the U.S.’s dominant position in the international system,” reflected in their consistent emphasis on great power military competition and economic security.²⁴

Think Tank Responses

Experts at leading foreign policy think tanks echoed the PRC’s official line that the Trump administration’s NSS represents a U.S. effort to pursue a more cost-effective hegemony. However, experts at PRC think tanks provided more detailed analyses on how they see the new NSS as seeking to recalibrate U.S. foreign policy and its potential impact on the PRC’s international position.

In mid-December, Fu Xiaogang, president of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), one of China’s leading America-watching think tanks subordinate to the Ministry of State Security, wrote a commentary titled “New Trends in the Logic of Hegemony: Interpreting the New U.S. National Security Strategy.”²⁵ According to Fu, the new NSS underscores a major shift in U.S. national security thinking from “globalism to a domestically centered, interest-driven strategy” based on “flexible realism.” According to Fu, the strategy outlined in the new NSS seeks to “reshape and repair” U.S. global dominance through a three-legged rebalancing of trade, geopolitics, and alliance relationships. In terms of trade, he argues that the U.S. has shifted to prioritize domestic industry and economic security over global economic efficiency. With regard to geopolitics, Fu contends the U.S. strategy focuses on the Western Hemisphere—the U.S.’s near abroad—as its top priority and charges America’s allies with contributing more to collective defense while the U.S. still maintains “absolute control over its

alliance system.”²⁶ Fu contends this is a U.S. effort to maintain its dominance while offloading the “costs of hegemony” onto allies.²⁷

While Fu does not see these changes as leading to a wholesale overhaul of U.S. foreign policy, he notes three strategic shifts with key implications for the U.S.-China relationship. The first is the 2025 NSS’s admission that total American primacy is unattainable, with the U.S. and China “now nearly evenly matched,” forcing Washington to concentrate on maintaining supremacy in specific key areas. This leads to the second U.S. shift on China, which is a move from “comprehensive containment” to economic competition focused on securing key American interests, while adopting a more selective approach to strategic competition that avoids reflexive confrontation with Beijing. The final shift, per Fu, is the U.S. moving from overall systems construction to more complex, interest-based interactions. Fu warns that this shift could lead Washington to exploit the “Taiwan issue as a strategic lever to contain the PRC, increase its bargaining power, and consolidate its alliance system.”²⁸

In an article for the Qianhai Institute of International Affairs, Meng Weizhan, a researcher at the Fudan University Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences, argues that although the NSS appears to take a more “toned down” approach to the PRC, the document “does not necessarily reflect the true intentions” of the second Trump administration toward China. Meng believes the document’s final draft may have taken a softer line to preserve maximum leverage for the U.S. in its ongoing trade negotiations with the PRC.²⁹ Nevertheless, Meng argues that structural factors will condition the U.S. to continue to regard China as a rival, given that it is the second-most powerful country in the international system. However, he observes that this competition is occurring as “U.S. strategists are beginning to acknowledge that American hegemony is in decline, or at least that a relative weakening of power is a factual reality at this stage.”³⁰ Meng posits that “given this, the U.S. must adjust its old strategy and design an approach to competing with China that matches its own national strength.”³¹ He likens the current strategic retrenchment under Trump to that of the U.S. under Nixon in the 1970s that set the stage for later Cold War successes that Reagan achieved against the Soviet Union.³²

In an interview with *Phoenix News*, Sun Chenghao, a fellow with the Tsinghua University Center for International Security and Strategy, sees the NSS as a “fundamental transformation” of U.S. foreign policy.³³ Sun characterizes the U.S. as shifting from global leadership and institution building to focusing on “sovereignty, cost-effectiveness, and results-oriented policymaking,” strategically reprioritizing the Western Hemisphere, and overhauling its approaches to both its allies and its primary strategic rivals, namely China and Russia. Nevertheless, Sun holds that despite shifts in American policy, U.S.-China relations are likely to “exhibit periodic stabilization within a structurally competitive framework.”³⁴ Per Sun, major structural tensions between the U.S. and China will persist over trade and Taiwan, and the re-emphasis of the Monroe Doctrine “will treat China’s presence in Latin America, energy domains, and key strategic corridors as priority challenges, seeking to narrow China’s operational space in the Western Hemisphere.”³⁵

In another article, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of American Studies researcher Gong Xiaofei noted that, “because the NSS does not explicitly designate China as a ‘strategic competitor’ and focuses on the Western Hemisphere, some argue that the U.S. is no longer committed to strategic competition with China and may even be intentionally relinquishing global leadership.”³⁶ However, Gong contends that this perspective is misguided, as the continuities far outweigh the changes in the new NSS.³⁷ According to Gong, the main adjustments made to the new NSS involve contraction, pulling back from global commitments, and taking steps to reshape the international order to make it more favorable to the U.S., including by countering Chinese economic predation and shifting defense costs to allies. In Gong’s view, these approaches comprise America’s “dual strategy” centered on both the Western Hemisphere and the Asia-Pacific regions. In this analysis, the two regions are not mutually exclusive but rather constitute “two flanks” protecting American hegemony, with the Western Hemisphere the “backyard” for maintaining homeland security and the Asia-Pacific region the “power center” that determines the stability of U.S. hegemony.³⁸

Experts at PRC think tanks were also quick to seize on the January 3 capture of Maduro as evidence of the U.S. implementing the new NSS’s focus on the Western Hemisphere. For example, Wang Youming, an expert at the China Institute of International Studies, noted in a *People’s Daily* commentary that “the left-wing Maduro regime clashes most sharply” with the new Monroe Doctrine laid out in the 2025 NSS.³⁹

Another piece by Zhang Jiadong, a professor at the Fudan University Center for American Studies, argues that “strategic contraction” is a recurring phenomenon in American history. During periods of strategic contraction, the “U.S. retreats from peak global interventionism to a state of introspection and selective intervention, shifting its focus to domestic prosperity and control of affairs in the Western Hemisphere.”⁴⁰ Zhang notes that strategic contraction by the U.S. creates both opportunities and risks for its strategic rivals, citing the 1930s and early 1940s Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan and the post-Vietnam War Soviet Union as cautionary examples.⁴¹ He observes that while Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union were all temporarily able to exploit U.S. retrenchment to achieve their own expansionist aims, all three revanchist powers “ultimately failed when the U.S. resumed its own strategic expansion.”⁴² This underscores the predominant view in the PRC’s strategic community that, even in retreat, the U.S. possesses immense latent power and could always re-exert itself in the international arena, potentially even more strongly, as it did in the 1940s and 1980s. Hence, despite subscribing to the concept of relative American decline, Chinese analysts continue to view the U.S. as an enduring great power.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the Department of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

End Notes

- ¹ “On December 8, 2025, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun hosted a regular press conference” [2025 年 12 月 8 日外交部发言人郭嘉昆主持例行记者会], Ministry of Foreign Affairs [中华人民共和国外交部], December 8, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202512/t20251208_11768723.shtml.
- ² Sujit Kumar Datta, “Success in Busan: U.S.-China Relationship Stabilizes,” *China-U.S. Focus*, November 21, 2025, <https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/success-in-busan-us-china-relationship-stabilizes>.
- ³ “Wang Yi: Facing A Troubled World Where Peace is Under Threat, China Acts as An Anchor for Stability,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 30, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjzbzd/202512/t20251231_11794218.html.
- ⁴ See for example, Fu Xiaoqiang [傅小强], “New Trends in the Logic of Hegemony: Interpreting the New US National Security Strategy” [霸权逻辑的新动向——解读美国新版《国家安全战略》], *Study Times* [学习时报], December 12, 2025, https://cn.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2025-12/12/content_118224458.shtml.
- ⁵ “Commentary | The New US National Security Strategy: A Guide to Cost Reduction and Efficiency Improvement for Hegemonism” [时评 | 美国新版国家安全战略：一部霸权主义的“降本增效”指南], *81.cn* [中国军网], December 11, 2025, http://www.81.cn/pl_208541/jdt_208542/16426554.html.
- ⁶ See for example, “Cartoon Commentary | They've stopped pretending! The American 'hegemonic script' has now torn off all pretense.” [漫评 | 演都不演了！美国“霸权剧本”如今已撕下所有伪装], *81.cn* [中国军网], January 7, 2026, http://www.81.cn/pl_208541/jdt_208542/16436178.html; “Behind the US's 'Operation Absolute Resolve' to remove Maduro: Control of \$17 trillion in oil and diverse resources, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of Latin America.” [美国“绝对决心”行动抓走马杜罗背后：控制 17 万亿美元石油及多元资源，重塑拉美地缘格局], *mrjxw.com* [每日经济新闻], January 6, 2026, <https://www.mrjxw.com/articles/2026-01-06/4209294.html>; Niu Haibin [牛海彬], “The main problem with Maduro's kidnapping was not the collusion of an insider” [马杜罗被掳，主要问题不在于内鬼配合], *Guancha* [观察者], January 4, 2026, https://www.guancha.cn/niuhaibing/2026_01_04_802694.shtml.
- ⁷ “US Hegemony and Its Perils,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 20, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367483.html.
- ⁸ “On December 8, 2025, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun hosted a regular press conference” [2025 年 12 月 8 日外交部发言人郭嘉昆主持例行记者会], Ministry of Foreign Affairs [中华人民共和国外交部], December 8, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202512/t20251208_11768723.shtml.
- ⁹ “On December 8, 2025, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun hosted a regular press conference.”
- ¹⁰ “On December 8, 2025, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun hosted a regular press conference.”
- ¹¹ “Taiwan Affairs Office: The DPP authorities' attempts to seek independence by relying on foreign powers and by force are doomed to failure.” [国台办：民进党当局“倚外谋独”、“以武谋独”注定失败], CCP Central Committee Taiwan Work Office and State Council Taiwan Affairs Office [中共中央台办、国务院台办], December 10, 2025, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/xwdt/xwfb/wyly/202512/t20251210_12739696.htm.
- ¹² “Taiwan Affairs Office: The DPP authorities' attempts to seek independence by relying on foreign powers and by force are doomed to failure.”
- ¹³ “Ministry of National Defense: We hope the U.S. will correct its strategic understanding of China” [国防部：希望美方校正对华战略认知], Ministry of National Defense [国防部], December 15, 2025, <http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/xwfy/yzxwfb/16427180.html>.
- ¹⁴ “Ministry of National Defense: We hope the U.S. will correct its strategic understanding of China.”
- ¹⁵ Zhong Yan [钟言], “Continuity and Change in the U.S. National Security Strategy” [美国国家安全战略的变与不变], December 16, 2025, <https://www.qstheory.cn/20251216/830f0c5562d343cda11ab810d683e98b/c.html>.
- ¹⁶ “Continuity and Change in the U.S. National Security Strategy”; Wen-Hsuan Tsai and Peng-Hsiang Kao “Secret Codes of Political Propaganda: The Unknown System of Writing Teams,” *China Quarterly*, Volume 214, June 2013, pp. 394 – 410, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/secret-codes-of-political-propaganda-the-unknown-system-of-writing-teams/9EC7B6A1395A69941B8E55D449F25C69>.
- ¹⁷ Zhong Yan [钟言] “Continuity and Change in the U.S. National Security Strategy” [美国国家安全战略的变与不变], December 16, 2025, <https://www.qstheory.cn/20251216/830f0c5562d343cda11ab810d683e98b/c.html>.

-
- ¹⁸ “Continuity and Change in the U.S. National Security Strategy”; Erik R. Quam, “PRC Conceptions of Comprehensive National Power: Part I,” *China Brief* (Jamestown Foundation) Volume 25 Issue 16, September 5, 2025, <https://jamestown.org/prc-conceptions-of-comprehensive-national-power-part-1/>.
- ¹⁹ “Commentary | The New US National Security Strategy: A Guide to Improving Hegemonic Cost Reduction and Efficiency” [时评 | 美国新版国家安全战略：一部霸权主义的“降本增效”指南], 81.cn [中国军网], December 11, 2025, http://www.81.cn/pl_208541/jdt_208542/16426554.html.
- ²⁰ “Commentary | The New US National Security Strategy: A Guide to Improving Hegemonic Cost Reduction and Efficiency.”
- ²¹ “In-depth analysis | What does the new US National Security Strategy say?” [深度解读 | 美国新版国家安全战略说了啥], Xinhua [新华社], December 10, 2025, <https://www.news.cn/world/20251210/b48299bfee74ab9b7cafa63180f8d18/c.html>.
- ²² “In-depth analysis | What does the new US National Security Strategy say?”
- ²³ “International Observation | Three Reports in Eight Years: The Continuity and Change in the US National Security Strategy” [国际观察 | 八年三份报告，美国国家安全战略的变与不变], Xinhua [新华社], December 12, 2025, <https://world.people.com.cn/n1/2025/1212/c1002-40623312.html>.
- ²⁴ “International Observation | Three Reports in Eight Years: The Continuity and Change in the US National Security Strategy.”
- ²⁵ Fu Xiaoqiang [傅小强] “New Trends in the Logic of Hegemony: Interpreting the New US National Security Strategy” [霸权逻辑的新动向——解读美国新版《国家安全战略》], Study Times [学习时报], December 12, 2025, https://cn.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2025-12/12/content_118224458.shtml.
- ²⁶ Fu Xiaoqiang, “New Trends in the Logic of Hegemony: Interpreting the New US National Security Strategy.”
- ²⁷ Fu Xiaoqiang, “New Trends in the Logic of Hegemony: Interpreting the New US National Security Strategy.”
- ²⁸ Fu Xiaoqiang, “New Trends in the Logic of Hegemony: Interpreting the New US National Security Strategy.”
- ²⁹ Meng Weizhan [孟维瞻], “As the United States begins to “recover and recuperate,” the long-term planning behind Trump's new national security strategy” [当美国开始“休养生息”，特朗普新国安战略背后的长期布局], Institute of International Affairs, Qianhai [前海国际事务研究院], December 10, 2025, <https://www.qiaa.org/zh-hans/node/1735>.
- ³⁰ Meng Weizhan, “As the United States begins to “recover and recuperate,” the long-term planning behind Trump's new national security strategy.”
- ³¹ Meng Weizhan, “As the United States begins to “recover and recuperate,” the long-term planning behind Trump's new national security strategy.”
- ³² Meng Weizhan, “As the United States begins to “recover and recuperate,” the long-term planning behind Trump's new national security strategy.”
- ³³ “Sun Chenghao: What Trump’s 2025 NSS Means for China,” ChinAffairs+, December 8, 2025, https://www.chinaffairsplus.com/p/sun-chenghao-what-trumps-2025-nss?hide_intro_popup=true.
- ³⁴ “Sun Chenghao: What Trump’s 2025 NSS Means for China.”
- ³⁵ “Sun Chenghao: What Trump’s 2025 NSS Means for China.”
- ³⁶ Gong Xiaofei [宫小飞], “Three Key Words in the U.S. National Security Strategy,” [《美国国家安全战略》的三个关键词], Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Special Issue, No. 821 [社科院专刊总第 821 期], December 16, 2025, https://www.cssn.cn/skgz/bwyc/202512/t20251216_5960179.shtml.
- ³⁷ Gong Xiaofei, “Three Key Words in the U.S. National Security Strategy.”
- ³⁸ Gong Xiaofei, “Three Key Words in the U.S. National Security Strategy.”
- ³⁹ Wang Youming [王友明]. “U.S. actions severely undermine regional peace, stability, and development” [美方行径严重破坏地区和平、稳定和发展（点评）]. People’s Daily [《人民日报》], January 5, 2026, https://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/pc/content/202601/05/content_30129280.html.
- ⁴⁰ “Hong Kong News Network: Zhang Jiadong: Trump's new national security report abandons the illusion of “permanent global hegemony” [香港新闻网：张家栋：特朗普新国安报告，放弃“永久全球霸权”的幻想], Hong Kong News Network [香港新闻网], December 12, 2025, <https://iis.fudan.edu.cn/9a/6a/c6897a760426/page.htm/>.
- ⁴¹ “Hong Kong News Network: Zhang Jiadong: Trump's new national security report abandons the illusion of “permanent global hegemony.”

⁴² “Hong Kong News Network: Zhang Jiadong: Trump's new national security report abandons the illusion of "permanent global hegemony.”